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Though the history of the interactions between ‘biology’ and metaphysics is almost as old as
Western philosophy itself (Lennox 2001), it seems fair to say that there has been a resurgence
of interest in this connection in the last couple of decades (e.g. Hull 1989; Millstein 2009;
Clarke 2011; Dupré 2012; Pradeu 2012; Godfrey-Smith 2013; Ferner 2016; Wiggins 2016).
Rediscovering this connection brings both opportunities and challenges.
Take, for example, the recent suggestions by certain philosophers of biology, especially John
Dupré and co-workers (Dupré 2012), to shift towards a processual view of the living world. The
shift, wherein organisms are to be considered processes rather than ‘things,’ is a dramatic and
generative one. However, those readers more firmly positioned within the sphere of analytic
metaphysics will know the kinds of objections that processual accounts excite, e.g., from sub-
stance-led Aristotelians. Organisms, the Aristotelian says, are substances that undergo processes,
but do not exemplify them. (For more general arguments for and against process-based ontolo-
gies, see Seibt 2013; Wiggins 2016.)
Albeit prominent, this is just one of many controversies about the metaphysical character of
living beings. As originally envisaged, the aim of this special issue was to flesh out this debate
alongside others, where the fields of biology, philosophy of biology, and metaphysics overlap.
More generally, we had thought to bring together a series of papers examining the various
frameworks, or ‘ontologies,’ within which one can pick out biological individuals (and to examine
the relationships between these ontological frameworks). In certain respects, we hope, this
special issue displays some of the successes of this project.
It is easy, however, to become overly beholden to ambitions of ‘success’—and, as editors, we
have found our failures just as, if not more, valuable and interesting.
Our intention for the issue was to bring together contributors from across the philosophical
spectrum, to try to nurture dialogue between them on these topics; we asked philosophers of
biology, analytic metaphysicians, and historians of science to help us examine the different ways
that biological reality can be partitioned. Though strictly speaking they are sub-disciplines, the
modes of inquiry and characteristic questions of these areas are sufficiently different for us to
label this project ‘interdisciplinary’ (though others might prefer the term ‘multidisciplinary’).
Yet interdisciplinarity is difficult. We enter this here not as an excuse (though perhaps we
should), but because it’s important to emphasize why exactly it is so difficult. We are convinced
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that the mode of interdisciplinary research is a promising avenue, but also that success will
require the identification of the main obstacles that need to be overcome.
There are, of course, practical obstacles to productive interdisciplinary discussion (Leonelli
and Ankeny 2015). It takes many years for an individual to become proficient in the modes and
methods, as well as the habitus, of their field. It would take a good many more for that same
individual to find their footing in another discipline, and academics working at a high level in
more than one discipline are thin on the ground. Moreover, the honing of the skills needed
to communicate one’s research to non-specialists (or those working outside one’s sphere) also
represents a considerable time investment. This temporal obstacle is also, inevitably, a financial
one, and the luxury to pursue extensive research ‘outside’ or orthogonal to one’s field is one that
most employed academics do not have.
At the same time, it’s true that there are transferable academic skills, and onemight hope that
researchers working at a certain level could usefully communicate with others working in related
fields. Sometimes, clearly, this hope is fulfilled. Unfortunately, optimism has its shortcomings.
We are surely not alone in noticing the confusions that arise—at ‘interdisciplinary’ conferences,
debates, and so forth—from terminological overlaps. When philosophers of biology talk about
identity, ontology, self, substance and process, they can mean something entirely different than
what an analytic metaphysician might, when she uses those selfsame terms.
‘Identity’ is perhaps the most commonly confused. For analytic metaphysicians, ‘identity’
is a very particular metaphysical-cum-logical relation (e.g. Perry 2002; Macdonald 2005; Lowe
2009). For philosophers of biology (and biologists) it can be used to mean a variety of things.
In some contexts of biology and philosophy of biology, ‘identity’ is taken to mean the peculiar
properties of a given thing. Some biologists talk about the genome or the histocompatibility
system (the ‘Human Leukocyte Antigens,’ or ‘HLA’ in humans) as the ‘identity card’ of the
organism, because it makes of each living being a unique being (e.g. Dausset 1981). As such,
however, these discussions about the genome and the HLA system are not concerned with the
specific metaphysical relation that holds e.g., for a living being between an earlier and a later
time.
This terminological confusion could perhaps be easily resolved, but there are others—around
words like ‘substance,’ for instance—that require a considerable amount of conceptual and his-
torical unpacking, even after they’ve been identified. Several philosophers of biology (e.g., Hull
1992) have proposed rejecting the substance-based view of individuality on the pretext that liv-
ing things do not retain their material substance unchanged throughout their existence (because
they can undergo maturation, metamorphosis, etc.). But metaphysicians need not think that
substance must remain materially unchanged (and indeed few of them do). The risk, then, is
that philosophers of biology and metaphysicians are simply not talking about the same things.
On the other side of the divide, most metaphysicians rely heavily on thought experiments,
even when examining issues directly related to the living world, e.g., brain transplantation
(e.g. Parfit 1984; Olson 1997, 2007). Further, whenmost metaphysicians talk about ‘organisms,’
they tend to mean a mammal or a familiar vertebrate, even though philosophers of biology have
pointed out for decades that the ambit of the term is far greater, and that taking into account the
actual diversity of the living world could have massive consequences for metaphysical debates
(e.g. Hull 1978). Discussions over ‘animalism’ (the view that each of us is an organism of the
species Homo sapiens and that we persist as animals; see Blatti and Snowdon 2016) illustrate
this tension between ‘vertebrate-centrism’ and wider approaches to what organisms are (Dupré
2014).
The result is failure of communication. People talk past each other—indeed, they think past
each other—and often fail to realise it.
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Interdisciplinary communication is epistemically perilous. Not only is there a risk of being
misunderstood, there is also the greater risk of not being aware of being misunderstood—and
thus being unable to correct consequent mistakes. Interdisciplinary work (produced by an indi-
vidual author) inhabits an epistemic no-man’s land, where the ability of intellectual communities
to critically assess the piece is impaired by its correlative knowledge requirements. These epi-
stemic perils are rarely tackled head-on, to the detriment of interdisciplinary discussion. This,
predictably, is a result of the current political milieu in higher education; in an academic world
dominated by notions of ‘impact,’ there are few resources to spare on improving, e.g., the struc-
ture of conferences, such that they might be more amenable to cross-disciplinary chatter.
Downstream of the practical obstacles are certain conceptual and methodological obstacles to
interdisciplinary discussion. Looking through the essays collected in this issue, it is clear that
there are different methodologies at play: the ‘philosophers of biology’ tend to focus on specific,
detailed biological inquiry, and to engage directly with the science; the ‘metaphysicians,’ by
contrast, tend towards varieties of conceptual analysis, and biological data is used primarily in
examples either to corroborate or to challenge specific metaphysical assumptions. These are
broad brush-stroke characterisations, but they point towards a potential conceptual block. The
picture of reality described by science is the product of certain modes of conceptualisation (for
example, crudely put, microscopes pick out different entities than the ones we pick out in our
everyday lives); the kind of conceptual analysis practiced by many analytic metaphysicians is
deeply tied to our (everyday) ways of thinking. There is a possibility, then, that the pictures
might not match up—and the biological individuals picked out in one sphere might be invisible
in the other.
None of this is to say that collaboration between disciplines (or sub-disciplines) is not de-
sirable or not often productive. Again, however, it is worthwhile focussing on how it might be
productive (and thuswhy it might be desirable). Interaction between different spheres might be
generative without being communicative; for example, a metaphysician might hear a biologist
describe some cellular process and find it a powerful metaphor for some philosophical concept.
This is a kind of lower-order benefit (as new perspectives often emerge from random encoun-
ters). Higher-order benefits, by contrast, involve actual communication and uptake and include
the investigation of problems in one field using conceptual tools from another. It is the latter
benefits which, presumably, the readers of this journal are aiming for—and it’s worthwhile to
make this explicit.
So: interdisciplinary projects, while important, are difficult. Recognising this, we might
begin to combat the issues that assail them. How? We could, for instance, begin challenging
the notion of the ‘polymath’ who can move fluidly between diverse fields; such people may exist,
but they are considerably scarcer than the current interdisciplinarity trend allows. Further, we
could critically examine the notion of ‘interdisciplinarity,’ and the motivations for pursuing it.
More importantly, perhaps, we should create and nurture new structures to host interdiscip-
linary discussion. These structures will appear in conference spaces, in classrooms, in books,
and in journals. Philosophy, Theory, and Practice in Biology is one such journal. In addition to
the virtues of being peer-reviewed, online, and fully open-access, its ‘position papers’ and ‘com-
ments’ capacity mean that it can accommodate extensive, genuine debate. Furthermore, for this
special issue, the editorial board have allowed us to give each contribution an individual editor-
ial introduction (rather than examining them all in a generic overview). In these introductions,
we have tried to place the contributions in helpful contrapositions, to draw out complementary
elements, and to trace a distinct narrative throughout the collection. We hope that the result
overcomes some if not all of the obstacles to interdisciplinarity outlined above.
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